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In this paper, we analyze the choice of primary prevention made by individuals who bear
a risk of being in bad health and an additive risk (of complications) that occurs after a
disease has been diagnosed. By considering a two argument utility (depending on wealth
and health), we show that the presence of a well-known (no ambiguity) additive risk of
complications induces more investment in primary prevention by a risk-averse agent only
if her preferences does not display some cross prudence in wealth (u122 < 0). If there
is some ambiguity on the e⁄ective probability of complication, an increase in ambiguity
aversion increases prevention if the agent is a correlation lover (u12 > 0). We also show
that full (partial) insurance can be optimal even if insurance premia are loaded (fair).
These results hold with and without prevention and the individuals attitudes toward
correlation help explain the impact of ambiguity on the optimal individual decisions.
Key Words : health; utility; ambiguity; prevention; insurance.
JEL Codes : D81; I19.1 Introduction
Causes of complications and death following the diagnosis of a disease are multiple
and not always well known. In hospital, nosocomial infections and medication errors
constitute major problems. Recently, medical researchers found that the incidence of
nosocomial infections is associated with mortality in excess compared to mortality caused
by the underlying diseases alone (see among others Gastmeier et al. (2007) and Grupper
et al. (2007)). Besides, medication errors can lead to adverse drug events (Kopp et al.
(2006), Sellier et al. (2009)) and individuals can react to these potential risks. Indeed
individuals￿risk perception of nosocomial infection di⁄ers from the objective risk (Abate
et al. (2008), Poujol et al. (2007)). A lack of information is generally suggested for
explaining this gap and the existence of a risk of health complications or mortality can
modify individuals￿behaviors in terms of health prevention.
In this paper, we propose to analyze individual choices of prevention made by indi-
viduals who bear, in addition to the risk of disease, an additive risk on the health status
after disease has been diagnosed (nosocomial infection or medication errors for instance).
Two types of prevention have been widely studied: (i) primary prevention which con-
sists of helping avoid a given health care problem (such as education promoting the use
of automobile passenger restraints, exercises, diet etc)1, and (ii) secondary prevention
which corresponds to identifying and treating asymptomatic persons who have already
developed risk factors or preclinical diseases but for whom the condition is not clinically
apparent (for example screening tests for hypertension, breast or prostate cancer).
Our objective is to better understand the determinants of primary prevention (which
corresponds to self-protection) when individuals are not well aware of the e⁄ect of the
additive risk on health and its implications on insurance demand. A direct link between
this setting and a concrete case can be easily made by focusing on the recent debate on
the H1N1 virus. Indeed when considering two individuals in good health but one is more
sensitive in case of disease, the question is to which extent this person should invest in
more prevention in order to reduce the probability of being contaminated by the H1N1
1Vaccines are also part of primary prevention for they reduce the probability of disease to almost
zero.
1virus, knowing that she has more chances to bear some complications (those persons are
babies, older people, pregnant women, asthmatic individuals, etc).
The literature on microeconomics of prevention in the health sector proposes several
papers on the individual trade-o⁄s between prevention and care (Eeckhoudt, Godfroid
and Marchand (1998)) and between prevention and insurance (Zweifel et al. (2009)). In
these models, individuals are supposed to have a perfect knowledge of the characteristics
of their risk and of the e⁄ectiveness of prevention. Nevertheless perfect information
about complications is not the rule. Instead, one observes often some hesitations of the
medical sta⁄ and, a fortiori of the individuals, when they have to evaluate the chances
that complications might occur in case of a given disease. Hence the probability of
having to face an additive risk is not always well known and individuals have to take
decisions in an ambiguous environment: risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are, ￿nally,
two concepts that play an important role in this decision process as recently showed, in
a one argument-utility model, by Alary, Gollier and Treich (2010).
Since Ellsberg (1961), a large experimental literature has con￿rmed that individuals
are averse to ambiguity, while a large theoretical literature has developed models to
accommodate this behavior (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon and
Vergnaud (2008) and Klibano⁄ et al. (2005) among others). In this paper, we consider
the Klibano⁄, Marinacci, Mukerji (2005) model in order to distinguish risk aversion from
aversion to ambiguity.
As did Dardanoni and Wagsta⁄(1990), we consider a two argument utility (depending
on wealth and health). We show that the presence of a well-known (no ambiguity)
additive risk induces more investment in primary prevention by a risk-averse individual
only if her preferences do not display some cross prudence on wealth (i.e. if u122(:;:) ￿ 0).
Hence we obtain a result close to the one obtained by Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) in
an expected utility model with well-known risks or to those proposed by Courbage and
Rey (2006) when individuals present some fear of sickness: prudence and prevention can
be opponents. The cross prudence concept, with the aversion to correlation, is developed
in Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007). It is notably showed how a variation in one
argument of the utility function can either mitigate or aggravate the impact of a variation
2in the other argument of the utility function. While cross prudence of wealth deals with
the impact of a variation of health on the variation of the marginal utility of wealth,
aversion to correlation implies that the individual dislikes a decrease of her wealth when
her health is already deteriorated.
Now, if there is some ambiguity on the e⁄ective probability of complication in case
of illness, then an increase of the ambiguity aversion increases prevention only if an
improvement of the health status increases the marginal utility of monetary wealth: This
means that the individual is correlation loving. A higher wealth is no longer valuable
if her health is deteriorated and, consequently, expenses in prevention can increase. We
still show how some public prevention and private prevention are either substitutes or
complements, depending on the type of the population at stake. Still here, the attitude
of the agents toward a correlation between the variations in wealth and in health helps
interpret the results.
In the second part of the paper, we obtain some original results related to insurance.
In particular, we show that full insurance can be optimal even if insurance premia are
loaded. More precisely, individuals that are averse to correlation dislike a decrease in
their wealth when their health is deteriorated: thus they prefer full insurance to partial
coverage even if it is (not too) costly, namely when the loading factor of the insurance
premium is strictly positive. On the contrary, with fair premia, an individual will not
always request full coverage when she is ambiguity averse but correlation loving. These
results hold with and without prevention. They highlight the fact that some individuals
are willing to be over-insured in the presence of ambiguity, which is never the case in
standard expected utility models with one, well known insurable risk (Arrow (1963),
Raviv (1979), Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), Spaeter and Roger (1997)). Our results
are much closer to those obtained by Jeleva (2000) with a non additive model or by
Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) within a Yaari framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the model, while Section 3
presents the impact of ambiguity and risk aversion on the optimal level of prevention
without insurance. In Section 4, we assume that the individuals can also buy insurance.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
32 The Model
We consider a static model in which an individual derives utility from consumption and
from the quality of her health status.
This individual agent faces a health risk. With probability p, she gets ill at the end
of the period and her health status is H (if considering only this risk). With probability
(1￿p), she remains in good health, H. She bears also an additive risk~ ￿, which represents
potential complications in case of illness which are due to an exogenous factor. For
the sake of simplicity, we consider two possible events: the complication appears with
probability q or does not appear with probability 1 ￿ q. Formally, this additive risk is
de￿ned by the random variable ~ ￿ = (0;1 ￿ q;￿;q);￿ > 0. As a direct consequence, the
health status in case of illness becomes H ￿~ ￿, and it is random, while it remains H in
the good state. Both random variables ~ ￿ and e H are independently distributed.
The ambiguity concerns the probability q of complications, which is perfectly known
neither by the individual nor by the insurer considered in Section 4.2 We denote as F(q),
the distribution of the random probability e q on [0;1] with F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1.
At the beginning of the period, the individual receives a revenue w, and chooses the
amount h she will invest in primary prevention. The cost of one unit of prevention is
normalized to one, and h units of prevention allow the agent to improve the probability p
of a good state of nature according to a technology represented by p(h), with: p0(h) < 0
and p00(h) > 0. Thus, the certain net wealth of the agent is w ￿h, while her ￿nal health
risk is e H =
￿
H;H;H ￿ ￿;1 ￿ p;p:(1 ￿ e q);p:e q
￿
. Her preferences over wealth and health
are represented by the utility function u(w ￿ h; e H):
For a given distribution q, the agent computes the expected utility:
U(h;q) = p(h)[qu(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)u(w ￿ h;H)] + (1 ￿ p(h))u(w ￿ h;H) (1)
Function u(:;:) depends on ￿nal wealth and on health. We suppose that in case of
death, H = 0, utility is equal to zero. It satis￿es u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u11 < 0 and u22 < 0.3
2Another situation, which is out of the scope of this paper, could be to consider that the agent is a
hospital, better informed than the insurer about the risk of complications.
3Index i denotes a partial derivative of the utility function with respect to argument i (i = 1 or 2).
4The individual dislikes a reduction in any attribute, ceteris paribus. And, as it is usually
assumed (see, among other papers, Courbage and Rey, 2006), the individuals are risk-
averse toward each separate risk: the wealth risk and the health risk. They dislike any
additive mean-zero risk on one or the other argument, ceteris paribus.
Following Klibano⁄, Marinacci, Mukerji (2005), ambiguity aversion is characterized
by a concave function T, de￿ned over U(:;:). With risk aversion being represented by the






with T 0(:) > 0 and T 00(:) ￿ 0. Just as the concavity of U represents the aversion
of the individual toward risk, the concavity of function T ￿ts with ambiguity-aversion.
Individuals are willing to pay a positive amount in order to eliminate ambiguity if it is
possible (that is in order to know with certainty the e⁄ective value of q).
The agent￿ s program writes ￿nally: maxh V (h).



























0(h)[qu(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)u(w ￿ h;H) (5)
￿ u(w ￿ h;H)]
￿ p(h)[qu1(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)u1(w ￿ h;H)]
￿ (1 ￿ p(h))u1(w ￿ h;H)
The optimal conditions are very close to those obtained without ambiguity. The ￿rst
term corresponds to the attitude toward ambiguity. The second term which is similar
to the standard one in prevention analysis is the di⁄erence between the expected utility
5bene￿t of reducing the probability of illness and the expected marginal value of ￿nal
wealth.
3 Ambiguity and Risk Aversion
In this section we analyze the impact of risk aversion and ambiguity on the optimal
investment in prevention made by the agent.
3.1 The impact of the presence of an additive risk
First let us consider that there is no ambiguity4: The probability of complications is
given and known. We denote it b q. Then function T(:) is the identity function and the





h=b h = 0 (6)
Proposition 1 For a given, unique, and strictly positive probability b q of the additive
risk, a risk averse individual will always invest more in prevention than without the
additive risk if u122(:;:) ￿ 0. On the contrary, if the agent￿ s preferences exhibit some
su¢ cient cross prudence in wealth (u122(:;:) > 0), prevention decreases.
Proof. See Appendix.
When utility is additively separable in wealth and health and when the preferences
exhibit some cross imprudence in wealth (u122 ￿ 0) as de￿ned by Eeckhoudt, Rey and
Schlesinger (2007), a risk-averse agent will always increase her optimal level of prevention
in the presence of an additive risk. Indeed, cross prudence in wealth means that a higher
wealth helps temper the detrimental e⁄ects of accepting the additive health risk. Thus,
if the preferences of the individual display some cross imprudence in wealth, the e⁄ect
of the additive risk on the health status is aggravated by a higher wealth. And a higher
level of ￿nancial investment in prevention just lessens the wealth level.
Besides, if some cross prudence in wealth is observed (u122 > 0), it is not possible to
conclude without focusing on the e⁄ective degree of cross prudence. Indeed, if considering
4Or, equivalently, that the agents are ambiguity neutral.
6the proof of Proposition 1, it is possible to show that prevention still increases with low
levels of the cross prudence degree, while it diminishes for agents largely (cross) prudent
in wealth. This result is due to the fact that we do not consider a mean-zero additive
risk on the health status as it is done by Eechoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) but a
pure risk of health deterioration. Thus by additive the risk e ￿, the health status in the
bad state of nature is always deteriorated compared to a situation in which no additive
risk exists. Thus, more than just some positive prudence is needed in order to reverse
the result compared to the case with u122 ￿ 0. Finally, by focusing on su¢ ciently high
coe¢ cients of cross prudence, we are able to obtain a result close to the one of Eeckhoudt
and Gollier (2005). Cross prudence leads to less prevention: If h decreases, then the ￿nal
wealth increases, mitigating the negative e⁄ect due to the presence of the additive risk
on the health status.
In what follows, prudence still explains some di⁄erences between the respective in-
dividual strategies of two di⁄erent agents. In particular, we obtain Courbage and Rey
(2006) result, thanks to their de￿nition of fear of sickness5 but in a model with an additive
risk. The agent￿ s preferences display some fear of sickness if she dislikes a decrease
Proposition 2 Let us consider two agents, 1 and 2. For a given, unique, strictly pos-
itive and lower than one probability b q of the additive risk, if Agent 1 has more fear of
sickness but is less cross prudent in health than Agent 2, then Agent 1 will invest more
in prevention than Agent 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result highlights one more time the fact that higher prudence can lead to less
prevention as in Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005). The more prudent individual, the higher
5"Fear of sickness measures the ￿ degree of future pain￿induced by the occurrence of the illness"
(Courbage and Rey, 2006,p 1324). Formally, if Agent 1 has more fear of sickness than Agent 2, then
there exists a function K(:) with K0(:) > 1 such that:
u2(:;H) = u1(:;H)
u2(:;H) = K(u1(:;H)) 8H < H:
It is worth noticing that fear of sickness implies risk aversion.
7the ￿nal wealth she needs to mitigate the negative e⁄ect of the health risk: this implies
lower expenses for prevention.
The results of Propositions 1 and 2 serve as benchmarks for the course of the paper,
where ambiguity (subsections 3.2. and 3.2.) and insurance (Section 4) are introduced.
3.2 Ambiguity aversion
To analyze the attitude toward ambiguity, we consider a change in the transformation
function T. We have to mobilize the concept of correlation aversion analyzed by Eeck-
houdt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007). In a two-argument utility model, wealth and health
for instance, a higher level of wealth mitigates the detrimental e⁄ect of a reduction in
the health status for a correlation averse agent. In terms of utility, correlation aversion
is formalized by u12 < 0.
Proposition 3 The optimal prevention increases with ambiguity aversion if individuals
are correlation loving, that is if u12 ￿ 0.
Proof. Let Agent 1 with T1 be less ambiguity-averse than Agent 2 with T2. Similarly
to the risk-aversion analysis, there exists an increasing and concave function k(:) such
that T2 = k(T1). As utility function U(h;q) is a decreasing function of q, we have for
any h and for all q in [0;1], U(h;q) < U(h;0). Then, for all q and all increasing function































if u12 is positive.
This last term is also positive if u12 is positive (see 5). Finally, the ￿rst order condition
of Agent 2 evaluated at h = h1 is positive so that h1 < h2.
As mentioned by Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) correlation aversion may not
be the rule in terms of realistic preferences. Indeed, a deterioration of health can be so
painful for an individual that no wealth could mitigate it. Thus u12 can also be positive,
8representing the preferences of correlation loving agents. It has been empirically showed
by Viscusi and Evans [1990] and Sloan et al. [1998], that u12 > 0 rather concerns severe
injuries. For minor ones, Evans and Viscusi [1991] ￿nd that u12 can be negative.
Technically, u12 ￿ 0 being a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for our result to
hold, it can also apply to not too negative values of u12.
From a positive point of view, the result of Proposition 3 is in line with what is
sometimes observed for large injuries. Money becomes less valuable if the individual is
not healthy enough to bene￿t from it. Thus, an increase in prevention is less costly in
terms of wealth loss for individuals more ambiguity averse when they are also correlation
lovers. Higher prevention does not help mitigate the negative e⁄ect due to the presence of
the additive health risk here, but rather the e⁄ect of ambiguity on its e⁄ective probability
of realization.
3.3 Increasing Risk
One crucial issue concerns the individuals￿responses to a change in the risk of com-
plications. Indeed, public authorities or medical services in hospitals can control the
probability of bad state of nature (facing some complications after a disease has been
diagnosed) by adopting some preventive measures or, on the contrary, by cutting into
some types of expenses. Since Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), di⁄erent measures (or
de￿nition) of an increase in risk have appeared in the literature. The most intuitive one
in our case is certainly the basic ￿rst order stochastic dominance.
Indeed a decrease of the risk of complications in the sense of the ￿rst order stochastic
dominance means that the probability q of facing some complications decreases, whatever
q. Formally , the distribution F(q) changes to a distribution G(q) with G(q) ￿ F(q) for
any q and with, at least, one strict inequality. In other non technical words, it is always
more likely to face some complications with distribution F than with distribution G.
Proposition 4 Optimal prevention increases following an increase in the risk of com-
plications in the sense of the ￿rst-order stochastic dominance, if u12 ￿ 0 and ambiguity
aversion is not too high.
9Proof. See Appendix.
Private prevention and public prevention can be viewed as either substitutes or com-
plements according to the level of ambiguity aversion. Indeed, let us consider the sym-
metric situation of Proposition 4 and suppose that medical services can mitigate the
risk of complications (in the sense of the ￿rst order stochastic dominance). Then some
agents may invest less in prevention. This is the case, in particular, for agents not too
ambiguity-averse and presenting some correlation love: if the total risk of illness is mit-
igated (the situation is improved), they also improve their wealth status by lessening the
preventive expenses. But if individuals are highly ambiguity averse, they may increase
their level of prevention, because their private activity of risk mitigation becomes more
e¢ cient, while public prevention is not su¢ cient for them.
4 Prevention and Insurance
Let us assume in this section that in case of illness, there exist some treatments which
allow the agent to improve her health status. We also assume that private insurance is
available. Treatments and their cost depend on the type of illness. It is fair to assume
that the treatment cost if complications are observed, denoted c(￿), is larger than the
one without complications, c(0). For simplicity￿ s sake and without loss of generality, we
also assume that the health status after treatment, denoted Ht, holds for bad states both
with and without complications.6 Nevertheless it cannot be larger than the one relative
to good health. Formally we have H < Ht < H.
The insurance market is competitive: insurance ￿rms act as risk neutral and ambiguity
neutral agents7. The compensation, I, paid by the insurance company to the insured
agent when she is ill, depends on the treatment cost: I(~ ￿) = ￿c(~ ￿) where ￿ is the
6Thus we do not make any di⁄erence with respect to duration. This is done by Bleichrodt, Crainich
and Eeckhoudt (2003) who analyze the impact of comorbidities on medical decisions. They consider a
two argument utility, depending on the quality of life and on duration. But wealth is not an explicit
variable of their model and ambiguity is not considered.
7No extra premium can be con￿scated from the insured agents.
10copayment8. The insurance premium, ￿, is de￿ned on the basis of the expected value of
indemnity,
￿ = ￿(1+￿)EqE￿c(~ ￿), where ￿ is the loading factor covering, in particular, administrative
costs of the insurer. Precisely we have:
￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)p(h)
Z 1
0
(qc(￿) + (1 ￿ q)c(0))dF(q)
where h is the level of primary prevention.
4.1 Insurance without prevention
First, let us analyze the demand for insurance without the possibility of investing in
prevention (Subsection 4.2. deals with both prevention and insurance). Here, we have
p(h) = p and the insurance premium writes
￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)p
Z 1
0
(qc(￿) + (1 ￿ q)c(0))dF(q): (7)
Each agent chooses the level of coinsurance, ￿, which maximizes her utility. The optimal
level of coinsurance satis￿es
￿






and ￿ de￿ned by (7).
Proposition 5 If u12 ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0 with ￿0 > 0, full insurance coverage is optimal.
If u12 > 0, full insurance is never optimal whatever the value of ￿.
8We assume here that only pure coinsurance contracts are proposed to the agents. Even if insurance
economics shows that deductibles are usually Pareto improving compared to coinsurance (Arrow, 1963;
Raviv, 1979; Gollier and Schlesinger, 1996; Spaeter and Roger, 1997) our assumption remains fair. First,
working with a two state model as we do induces that a deductible contract and a coinsurance contract
are equivalent (see Doherty and Eeckhoudt, 1995, for instance). Second, from a more positive point of
view, coinsurance contracts are still observed in private health insurance (sometimes associated with
deductibles).
11Proof. See Appendix.
This results hold whatever the attitute toward ambiguity of the agent and they di⁄er
from some standard results in insurance economics. First, if u12 ￿ 0, full insurance
remains the optimal contract even if insurance is costly (￿ > 0) and this holds even
for ambiguity neutral agents. It should be recalled that u12 ￿ 0 concerns an agent
who presents some correlation aversion. Hence a higher level of wealth can mitigate the
negative e⁄ect she bears in case of complications. Thus she prefers full insurance for her
￿nancial wealth even if it is costly for her. This result contrasts with those obtained in
a well-known risk setting (Arrow (1963), Raviv (1979), Gollier and Schlesinger (1996),
Spaeter and Roger (1997), ...). Besides, such a result is to be brought closer to the
results obtained by Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) with a Yaari model or by Jeleva
(2000) in a Choquet capacity context9. They also obtain the optimality of full insurance
in some cases with loaded insurance premia, questioning once more the universality of
the pareto-optimality of partial insurance when insurance is costly.
The second result of Proposition 5 is that u12 > 0 always leads to the optimality
of partial insurance even without any loading factor of the insurance premium. And
u12 > 0 means that the individual is correlation loving: the existence of the additive
risk on the health status does not give her su¢ cient incentives to obtain the highest
possible wealth level in case of complications. She prefers to retain part of her ￿nancial
risk. Thus the question of the superiority of full insurance over partial insurance in an
environment without any fraud considerations and any administrative costs is still to be
discussed.
Now, when considering more practical features, it seems fair to assume that adminis-
trative costs are rather large in the health sector and, in particular at least as high as in
non-life insurance (they account for 30% of the premium in car insurance for instance).
Thus from the above results, partial insurance should be the rule. Nevertheless, Propos-
9In this latter model, the optimality of full insurance when the premium is loaded is obtained when
the agent is more pessimistic than the insurer about her probability of loss. In our setting, ambiguity
holds for both agents and the insurer is less ambiguity averse than the insured individual (actually, he
is ambiguity neutral).
12ition 6 hereafter shows that ambiguity could rehabilitate full insurance as an optimum
even for high loading factors.
Proposition 6 Ambiguity aversion increases the level of insurance.
Proof. See Appendix.
As for risk aversion, the e⁄ect of ambiguity aversion on optimal insurance is unam-
biguous. Moreover, ambiguity aversion reinforces risk aversion: The insurance demand
increases.
4.2 Increasing Risk
As for prevention in Subsection 3.3. we want to analyze the e⁄ect of an increase of the
risk of complications on the optimal demand of insurance. Still here, we consider ￿rst
order stochastic dominance changes of the distribution F(q).
Proposition 7 The insurance demand increases with an increase in "risk of complica-
tions", in the sense of the ￿rst-order stochastic dominance, if ambiguity aversion is not
too high.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.
If public prevention makes it possible to mitigate the risk of complications, it can
induce individuals to decrease or increase their level of insurance demand. Indeed, let
us suppose one can diminish the probabilities of complication. This "good" change in
distribution can give the agents some incentives to diminish their insurance demand.
But if individuals are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse, insurance demand can increase. As a
direct consequence of Proposition 7, public prevention and insurance can be complements
for high ambiguity averse agents and substitutes for others. Hence a public policy the
aim of which is to contribute to the mitigation of the risk of complications (at hospital
for instance) will have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the demand of insurance, depending on the
population that is at stake.
Finally, insurance demand and preventive investment behave similarly when con-
sidered separately. Both an increase in the ambiguity aversion of the agent and an
13increase in the risk of complications may increase insurance demand. It was also the
case for prevention when considered alone in the preceding section. Do these results still
hold when insurance and private prevention are considered simultaneously by the agent
as two activities that can mitigate the health risk?
4.3 Insurance with prevention
Now, let us assume that the agents can buy insurance and, simultaneously, invest in
prevention. Each agent has to choose the level of coinsurance, ￿, and the level of pre-
vention, h, which maximize her utility. Prevention is observable by the insurer and it is
taken into account when the premium is computed. For a given distribution q of e ￿, the
agent computes now the expected utility:
U(￿;h;q) = p(h)[qu(w ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c(￿) ￿ h;H
t) + (1 ￿ q)u(w ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c(0) ￿ h;H
t)]
+(1 ￿ p(h))u(w ￿ ￿ ￿ h;H) (9)








￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)p(h)
Z 1
0
(qc(￿) + (1 ￿ q)c(0))dF(q) (11)
Proposition 8 When the agent can simultaneously buy proportional insurance and in-
vest in prevention, full insurance coverage is optimal if u12 ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿1 with ￿1 > 0.
If u12 > 0, full insurance is never optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
The non systematic optimality of partial insurance when insurance premia are loaded
still holds if the agent can make some prevention. Still here, prudence is not necessary
to obtain the result but correlation attitude.
145 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the investment in prevention and/or in insurance
by an individual who faces two risks: a ￿rst risk of being in bad health and a second
one, which takes place only in the bad health state and which worsens it. While the
distribution of the ￿rst health risk is well known by all the agents, the distribution
of the risk of complications is not perfectly known and ambiguity holds. This last
assumption illustrates well many realistic situations (nosocomial infections at hospital,
relative ignorance about one￿ s resistance in case of illness, ...) although it has seldom
been considered in health economics.
Attitude toward risk and toward ambiguity are de￿ned from a two argument utility
function. It depends on the health status and on wealth. Thus we were able to use
the really meaningful concept of correlation aversion developed in Eeckhoudt, Rey and
Schlesinger (2006). We also refer to cross prudence as done in Eeckhoudt, Rey and
Schlesinger (2007) and in Courbage and Rey (2006).
First we showed that in the absence of ambiguity a risk-averse individual invests
more in primary prevention only if her preferences do not display some cross prudence
on wealth (i.e. if u122(:;:) ￿ 0). Our result is close to the one obtained by Eeckhoudt and
Gollier (2005) in an expected utility model with well-known risks or to those proposed
by Courbage and Rey (2006) when individuals present some fear of sickness: prudence
and prevention can be opponents.
If there is some ambiguity on the e⁄ective probability of complication in case of illness,
then an increase of the ambiguity aversion increases prevention only if an improvement
of the health status increases the marginal utility of monetary wealth. In that case
the individual is correlation loving. A higher wealth is no longer valuable if her health
is deteriorated and, consequently, expenses in prevention can increase. By considering
changes in the risk of complications in the sense of ￿rst order stochastic dominance,
still we showed how some public prevention and private prevention are either substitutes
or complements, depending on the type of the population at stake. Precisely, a more
ambiguity averse agent will more often increase her level of prevention if the risk of
15complications is mitigated. On the contrary, a not too ambiguity averse individual will
prefer to consider public prevention and private prevention as complements. From a
decision-making perspective, those results suggest that a public policy the aim of which
would be to mitigate some kinds of additive health risks, at hospital for instance or
within a speci￿c category of individuals, should give room to the risk and ambiguity
attitudes of the concerned individuals.
In the second part of the paper, we considered also insurance of medical treatments.
We showed that full insurance can be optimal even if insurance premia are loaded.
Individuals that are averse to correlation dislike a decrease in their wealth when their
health is deteriorated, thus preferring full insurance to partial coverage even if it is (not
too) costly. On the contrary, with fair premia, an individual will not always demand full
coverage when she is ambiguity averse but correlation loving. These results hold with
and without prevention and they highlight the fact that some individuals are willing to
be over-insured in the presence of ambiguity, which is never the case in standard expected
utility models with one well known insurable risk (Arrow (1963), Raviv (1979), Gollier
and Schlesinger (1996), Spaeter and Roger (1997)). Our results are much closer to those
obtained by Jeleva (2000) with a non additive model or by Doherty and Eeckhoudt
(1995) within a Yaari framework.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
(1) and (6) yield:
0 = p
0(b h)[b qu(w ￿b h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)u(w ￿b h;H) ￿ u(w ￿b h;H)]
￿p(b h)[b qu1(w ￿b h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)u1(w ￿b h;H)] ￿ (1 ￿ p(b h))u1(w ￿b h;H)
Let us suppose now that the additive risk is a degenerate random variable that takes
the certain value b q￿. In case of illness, the health status is equal to H ￿ b q￿. The optimal
level of prevention h0 satis￿es in such a situation:
0 = p
0(h0)[u(w ￿ h0;H ￿ b q￿) ￿ u(w ￿ h0;H)]
￿p(h0)u1(w ￿ h0;H ￿ b q￿) ￿ (1 ￿ p(h0))u1(w ￿ h0;H)
16Consequently, an individual will invest more in prevention in the presence of an
additive risk if and only if
0 > p
0(h0)[u(w ￿ h0;H ￿ b q￿) ￿ (b qu(w ￿ h0;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)u(w ￿ h0;H))]
￿p(h0)[u1(w ￿ h0;H ￿ b q￿) ￿ (b qu1(w ￿ h0;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)u1(w ￿ h0;H))]
which is true if the individual is risk averse (u22 < 0) and u122 ￿ 0. If u122 > 0 it
is not possible to conclude about the sign of the concerned expression. Proposition 1 is
demonstrated. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2.
Without ambiguity on the adding risk and from (2) and (1), the ￿rst order condition
















i; e H ￿e ￿) = 0
with vi(hi) = ui(w ￿ hi;H) ￿ [b qui(w ￿ hi;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)ui(w ￿ hi;H)] and
Eui




hi;H), the expected marginal utility of wealth.
An agent is cross prudent in health i⁄ u122(:;:) > 0. If Agent 1 is less cross prudent
than Agent 2 in health, then u1
1 is less convex than u2
1 with respect to health. Then her
expected marginal utility is always lower than the one of Agent 2: Eu1
1(w ￿h; e H ￿e ￿) <
Eu2
1(w ￿ h; e H ￿e ￿).
(ii) Now, let us assume that fear of sickness, as de￿ned by Courbage and Rey (2006),







1(:;H)) 8H < H:
Let us recall that ui(0;0) = 0 for any agent i. We have, for any h,
17v
2(h) = u
2(w ￿ h;H) ￿ [b qu
2(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)u
2(w ￿ h;H)]
= u
1(w ￿ h;H)) ￿ [b qK(u
1(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿)) + (1 ￿ b q)K(u
1(w ￿ h;H))]
= u
1(w ￿ h;H)) ￿ [b qu
1(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ b q)u
1(w ￿ h;H)]
+b q[u
1(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿) ￿ K(u
1(w ￿ h;H ￿ ￿)) + (1 ￿ b q)[u




with a = b q[u1(w￿h;H ￿￿)￿K(u1(w￿h;H ￿￿))+(1￿b q)[u1(w￿h;H)￿K(u1(w￿
h;H))] < 0.
Finally, we obtain that V 2
h (h1) < V 1
h (h1) = 0 and h2 < h1. Proposition 2 is demon-
strated. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us consider the distribution of probability, G, such that F(q)￿G(q) ￿ 0;8q, with
at least one strict inequality. The level of prevention, h, increases with G compared to





























[F(q) ￿ G(q)]dq ￿ 0 (12)
We have
@U(h;q)
@q < 0 (see (1)),
@2U(h;q)
@h@q > 0 is positive under the assumption u12 ￿ 0.
The sign of
@U(h;q)
@h can be positive or negative according to the values of q (see(5)).
This expression is increasing in q and negative at q = 0 if u12 ￿ 0. Let us de￿ne q1 as
satisfying
@U(h;q1)






























[F(q) ￿ G(q)]dq ￿ 0 (13)











T0 is the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion as de￿ned by Klibano⁄, Marinacci,
Mukerji (2005). Proposition 4 is demonstrated. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5.

































= (1 + ￿)p
Z 1
0
(qc(￿) + (1 ￿ q)c(0))dF(q)
= (1 + ￿)p
Z 1
0
Eq [c(e ￿)]dF(q) > 0: (16)



























t) + (1 ￿ p)u1(w ￿ ￿;H)]
+ pu1(w ￿ ￿;H
t)Eq [c(e ￿)]:
Expression (16) at ￿ = 0 writes @￿
@￿ = p
R 1
0 Eq [c(e ￿)]dF(q). Expression U(1;q) is
independent of q. Let us rewrite it U1 = U(1;q). The ￿rst order condition (14) becomes,



























Eq [c(e ￿)]dF(q):[pu1(w ￿ ￿;H











Eq [c(e ￿)]dF(q)[(1 ￿ p)u1(w ￿ ￿;H





t) ￿ u1(w ￿ ￿;H)
￿Z 1
0
Eq [c(e ￿)]dF(q) (17)
With Ht < H by de￿nition, this expression is positive i⁄ u12 < 0 and, ￿nally, we have
￿ = 1 in optimum. This result is obtained with ￿ = 0. However it still holds for
0 < ￿ ￿ ￿0: Indeed, the right-hand-side term in the above expression is just modi￿ed by
the added term
￿￿:p[pu1(w ￿ ￿;H




Eq [c(e ￿)]dF(q); (18)
which is equal to zero for ￿ = 0, strictly negative for ￿ > 0 and decreasing in ￿. Since
it is also continuous, there exists a strictly positive value ￿0 such that the ￿rst order
condition for any ￿ < ￿0, and equal to (17) + (18) remains positive. Proposition 5 is
demonstrated. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6.
Let us consider two agents 1 and 2, with functions T1 and T2. Let us suppose that
there is an increasing and concave function k such that T2 = k(T1). As utility function
U(￿;q) is a decreasing function of q, for all q in [0;1], U(￿;q) is less than U(￿;0). Then,

































@￿@q > 0. With c(￿) > c(0) and u11 < 0 by assumption, this is the case. Indeed,
from (15) in Appendix we have @2U
@￿@q = p[(c(￿)￿ @￿
@￿)u1(w￿￿+I(￿)￿c(￿);Ht)￿(c(0)￿
@￿
@￿)u1(w ￿ ￿ + I(0) ￿ c(0);Ht)].
Consequently, the last term of the above inequality is positive. Finally, the ￿rst
order condition of Agent 2 evaluated at ￿ = ￿1 is strictly positive, so that ￿1 < ￿2.
Proposition 6 is demonstrated. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8.








































0(h)[qu(w ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c(￿) ￿ h;H
t)
+ (1 ￿ q)u(w ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c(0) ￿ h;H







[qu1(w ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c(￿) ￿ h;H
t)
+ (1 ￿ q)u1(w ￿ ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)c(0) ￿ h;H
t)]









= (1 + ￿)p(h)
Z 1
0
(qc(￿) + (1 ￿ q)c(0))dF(q) > 0 (21)
@￿
@h




(qc(￿) + (1 ￿ q)c(0))dF(q) < 0: (22)
The course of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5. ￿
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